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Abstract 
 
This paper looks at the integration of regions and nations through the prism of the merger 
of populations. The paper employs a particular index of social dismay. It presents 
examples of two of the main results arising from the study of the merger of two 
populations: that the social dismay of an integrated population is greater than the sum of 
the social dismay of the constituent populations when apart, and that a self-contained, 
non-publicly financed policy aimed at retaining the levels of wellbeing of individuals at 
their pre-merger magnitudes cannot be implemented: there is not enough of a gain to 
compensate for the loss.   
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1. Introduction 
 
This paper looks at the integration of regions and nations through a somewhat unusual 
prism. Consider European integration - one of the most interesting social science 
experiments of recent times. In terms of the variance in the attributes (including the 
income levels) of the nations that are pooled together, as well as in terms of the scale of 
the pooling, the process is of little precedence. For these reasons, and since from a 
historical perspective the process is quite young, it is not all that obvious or certain that 
what we witness today is here to stay. And, as is often the case, what we observe may 
differ from what lurks underneath. 
 
In what follows we do not strive to provide a balance sheet of the advantages and 
disadvantages of integration which, undoubtedly, include various efficiency and 
productivity gains. Rather, we seek to highlight a particular worrisome aspect of 
integration.  
 
Integration can be perceived as a merger of populations. Mergers of populations 
occur in all spheres of life, and in all times and places: conquests bring hitherto disparate 
populations into one, provinces merge into regions, adjacent villages that experience 
population growth merge into one town, schools and school classes are merged, and as 
already noted, European countries have been merging into a union. We employ a 
particular social index (a statistic), Total Relative Deprivation, TRD, to assess the 
repercussions of a merger. We first present this index. Following that, we show that in the 
case of two populations of two persons each with incomes that are all distinct (pairwise 
different), the TRD of a merged population is larger than the sum of the TRDs of the 
constituent populations when apart. This finding raises the disturbing possibility that in 
and by itself, integration (for example, European integration) may fail to constitute a 
panacea of social harmony, or to reward the populace with a sense of improved 
wellbeing.  
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We next consider a self-contained, non-publicly financed policy aimed at retaining 
individuals’ levels of wellbeing at their pre-merger magnitudes. Quite surprisingly, a 
policy of the latter type, which is the staple of public finance (a Pareto neutralizing 
transfer from the gainers to the losers), cannot be implemented even in a class of simple 
cases: the loss is more formidable than the gain.   
 
2. A measure of social (societal) dismay  
 
Consider a population N of n  individuals whose incomes are 1 2 ... nx x x≤ ≤ ≤ , where 
2n ≥ . The relative deprivation, RD, of an individual whose income is ix , 1,..., 1i n= − , is 
defined as  
 
1
1( ) ( )
n
N i k i
k i
RD x x x
n = +
≡ −∑ , (1) 
and it is understood that 0)( =nN xRD . Let ( )iF x  be the fraction of those in the 
population whose incomes are smaller than or equal to xi. Then we have the following 
claim. 
 
Claim 1: ( )( ) [1 ( )] |N i i i iRD x F x E x x x x= − ⋅ − > . That is, the relative deprivation of an 
individual whose income is ix  is the fraction of those in the population whose incomes 
are higher than ix  times their mean excess income. 
 
Proof: Let us denote by ik  the smallest [ 1, ]k i n∈ +  for which k ix x> . That is, ik  is the 
index of the first individual to the right of xi in the ordered distribution whose income is 
strictly higher than xi. Since for different i’s there are different corresponding k’s, we use 
the term ik .
1 Then we have that  
                                                 
1 For example, let the incomes of a population of five individuals be 1 1x = , 2 2x = , 3 2x = , 4 3x = , 
5 4x = . Consider 2x . The next individual with an income higher than 2x  is the individual whose income is 
4x . Consequently, k2 = 4. 
 3 
1
1 1( ) ( ) ( )
(1 / )( )[1 ( )]
1 ( )
[1 ( )] ( | ).
i
i
n n
N i k i k i
k i k k
n
k i
i
k k i
i i i
RD x x x x x
n n
n x xF x
F x
F x E x x x x
= + =
=
≡ − = −
−= − −
= − − >
∑ ∑
∑
,
 
The total relative deprivation of the population, TRD, is naturally the sum of the 
relative deprivations of all the individuals, 
 
1
1 1 1
1( ) ( )
n n n
N N i k i
i i k i
TRD RD x x x
n
−
= = = +
= = −∑ ∑ ∑ . (2) 
We resort to TRD as a measure of social dismay.2 
 
3. Comparing the TRD of a merged population with the sum of the TRDs of two 
constituent populations of two-persons each  
 
In this section we show that except in the degenerate case in which the incomes of one 
population are identical to the incomes of the other population, the merger of two 
populations of two-person each results in the TRD of the merged population being higher 
than the sum of the TRDs of the constituent populations. This is not an intuitively obvious 
result even in the simple case in which the two populations do not overlap and a 
relatively poor, two-person population merges with a relatively rich, two-person 
population. In such a case, it is quite clear that upon integration the members of the 
poorer population are subjected to more relative deprivation, whereas the members of the 
richer population except the richest are subjected to less relative deprivation. Since one 
                                                 
2 Such a characterization of societal relative deprivation was proposed by Yitzhaki (1979) and axiomatized 
by Bossert and D’Ambrosio (2006) and Ebert and Moyes (2000) who in turn followed the seminal work of 
Runciman (1966). Since the 1960s, a considerable body of research evolved, demonstrating empirically 
that interpersonal comparisons of income (that is, comparisons of the income of an individual with the 
incomes of higher income members of his reference group) bear significantly on the perception of well-
being, and on behavior. (For a recent review see Clark, Frijters, and Shields (2008)). One branch of this 
body of research has dealt with migration. Several studies have shown empirically that a concern for 
relative deprivation impacts significantly on migration outcomes (Stark and Taylor (1989), Stark and 
Taylor (1991), Quinn (2006), Stark, Micevska, and Mycielski (2009)). Theoretical expositions have shown 
how the very decision to resort to migration and the choice of migration destination (Stark (1984), Stark 
and Yitzhaki (1988), Stark and Wang (2007)), as well as the assimilation behavior of migrants (Fan and 
Stark (2007)), are modified by a distaste for relative deprivation. 
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constituent population experiences an increase of its TRD while the other constituent 
population experiences a decrease, whether the TRD of the merged population is higher 
than the sum of the TRDs of the constituent populations cannot be ascertained without 
additional formal analysis. To this end we now state and prove the following claim.  
 
Claim 2: Let there be two populations of two-persons each: population A, and population 
B. Let the incomes of the four persons be distinct. A merger C=A∪B results in an 
increase of TRD, that is, .BAC TRDTRDTRD +>  
 
Proof: With all incomes distinct (pairwise different) we assume, without loss of 
generality, that the smallest income is 1 and that it is obtained in population A. Thus, the 
incomes in population A are 
1, 1 + α, 
and the incomes in population B are 
1 + β, 1+ β + δ, 
where , , 0α β δ >  are arbitrary. 
Clearly, 
2A
TRD α= , and 
2B
TRD δ= . 
To evaluate the TRD of the four-individual population C with incomes 
1,1 ,1 ,1a a b a b c+ + + + + +  
and with arbitrary a,b,c > 0, we note, referring to the four individuals as (1), (2), (3), and 
(4), that 
1 1(1) ( ( ) ( )), (2) ( ( )), (3) , (4) 0.
4 4 4
cRD a a b a b c RD b b c RD RD= + + + + + = + + = =  
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Therefore, 
1(1) (2) (3) (3 4 3 )
4C
TRD RD RD RD a b c= + + = + + .   (3) 
We now consider the TRD of C A B= ∪ . Depending on the relative magnitudes of 
, ,α β δ  we have three cases. 
Case 1. α β< . Then, β α ε= +  for some 0ε > . Then we have incomes 
1,1 ,1 ( ),1 ( ) .α α ε α ε δ+ + + + + +  
Using (3), 
1 (3 4 3 ) .
4 2 2C A B
TRD TRD TRDα δα ε δ= + + > + = +  
Case 2. β α β δ< < + . Then, α β ε= + . Then we have incomes 
1,1 ,1 ,1 ( ),β β ε β ε δ ε+ + + + + + −  
and we note, because β δ α+ > , that 0δ ε− >  for some 0ε > . Using this and (3),  
1 1(3 4 3( )) (3 2 2 ) .
4 4 2 2 2 2C A B
TRD TRD TRDβ ε δ α δβ ε δ ε β ε δ += + + − > + + > + = + = +  
Case 3. α β δ> + . Then, α β δ ε= + +  for some 0ε > . Then we have incomes 
1,1 ,1 ,1 .β β δ β δ ε+ + + + + +  
From (3), 
1 (3 4 3 ) .
4 2 2 2 2C A B
TRD TRD TRDβ δ ε δ α δβ δ ε + += + + > + = + = +  
Therefore, 
A B A BTRD TRD TRD∪ > +  
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in all possible cases. ,  
 
Corollary: In the degenerate case in which the incomes of population A are identical to 
the incomes of population B, AC TRDTRD = .BTRD+  
 
Proof: Since without loss of generality the incomes in population A are {1, 1+α}, and the 
incomes in population B are {1, 1+α}, we have that 
2A B
TRD TRD α= = . The TRD of 
population C with incomes {1, 1, 1+α, 1+α} is RD(1) + RD(1) = 2 2 .
4 2 4 2
α α α α α+ +⋅ + ⋅ =  
But A BTRD TRD α+ =  as well. ,  
 
Another way of seeing this is as follows. When the incomes of population A are 
identical to the incomes of population B, merging the two populations is equivalent to 
doubling the number of income recipients of each income. Since TRD is a measure with 
homogeneity of degree one (increasing the size of every group of income recipients by a 
factor of k implies that TRD also increases by a factor of k), it follows that  
{1,1,1 ,1 } {2 1,2 (1 )} 2 {1,1 } .C A BTRD TRD TRD TRD TRD TRDα α α α= + + = ⋅ ⋅ + = + = + ,  
 
4. A policy response to the post-merger increase in TRD 
 
The target of a policy response is a derivative of the underlying social welfare function. A 
policy can be enacted out of a concern that individuals’ levels of wellbeing do not 
decrease upon a merger.  
 
To ease exposition, we employ in what follows a somewhat modified notation. 
Consider a population of n individuals with a vector of incomes Tnxx )( 1 …=x , 
0ix ≥ , 1,...,i n= . We measure the i-th individual’s relative deprivation as in (1), which 
we can rewrite as  
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∑
=
−= n
j
iji xxn
xRD
1
)0,max(1),( x . 
Correspondingly, total relative deprivation is written as  
∑
=
= n
i
ixRDTRD
1
),()( xx . 
 
Let the individuals’ preferences be characterized by a combination of absolute 
income and relative deprivation: ( , ) (1 ) ( , )i i i i i iu u x x RD xα α= = − −x x  where 0 1iα< < , 
1,2,...,i n= . The underlying idea of the stated policy response is to skim off income from 
those who reap a gain as a consequence of the merger, and distribute that income to those 
who experience a loss as a consequence of the merger, such that following the merger no 
individual will be worse off. There are several problems with such a scheme, however. 
 
First, a necessary condition is that there has to be at least one gainer. But as is quite 
obvious, there may not be any as, for example, when population {1, 2, 3, 4} joins 
population {5, 5}.  
 
Second, for the policy to be applicable, the policy maker would need to know iα . If 
each individual has his own distinct preference structure, the required information is 
colossal: a policy response that is based on preferences needs to build on invisibles. Two 
possibilities then come to mind: that all the individuals share the same distaste for relative 
deprivation, or that they do not. We attend in detail to the former possibility: iα α=  
, 1,2,..., .i i n∀ =  
 
That all the individuals share the same distaste for relative deprivation eases 
drastically the information requirements, allowing working with a single α. But then, 
even in the simplest configuration of incomes, impossibility strikes. To see why, consider 
),()1(),( xx iiii xRDxxuu α−−α==  where 0 1α< < , and let the two income groups be 
A with (1)A =x , and B with (2,3)B =x . Upon a merger, the relative deprivation of the 
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individual with income 2 is lowered from RD(2, (2,3)) = 1/2 to RD(2, (1,2,3)) = 1/3. We 
could reduce this individual’s income somewhat and transfer the amount that we skim off 
to the individual with income 1 whose RD upon the merger was rising from zero to 1. We 
know that we cannot take away from the individual with income 2 more than 1/2 because 
if we were, he will have both less income than he had prior to the merger and more RD 
than the 1/2 that he had prior to the merger. Therefore, we take away less than 1/2, say, 
1/2 – ε, where 10,
2
ε ⎛ ⎤∈⎜ ⎥⎦⎝  so as to leave the individual no worse off than he were to begin 
with, ensuring that  
1 1 12 , 1 ,2 ,3 (2,(2,3))
2 2 2
uu ε ε ε⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞− − + − − − ≥⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 
which translates into 
3 1 3 1(1 ) 3 2 (1 )
2 3 2 2
α ε α ε α α⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞+ − − − + ≥ − −⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦  
and which, after simplification, yields the condition 
34
2
−ε
ε−≤α . 
We also have that following the transfer, the income of 1 is elevated to 1 + (1/2– ε), and 
that the RD of the individual with income 1 (in the income distribution 
( )A B =(1 1/ 2 – ,3 / 2 ,3)ε ε∪ + +x ) is 1/2 + ε. Seeing to it that the individual with income 1 
will not be worse off requires the post-merger, post-transfer wellbeing not to be less than 
the pre-merger wellbeing 1⋅α . That is, we require that  
3 1(1 )
2 2
α ε α ε α⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞− − − + ≥⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ , 
or that  
 9 
ε+≥α
2
1 . 
Upon combining this last condition with the condition for individual with income 2, we 
get a set of two inequalities 
34
2
−ε
ε−≤α  
ε+≥α
2
1 . 
These inequalities cannot, however, be satisfied for 10,
2
ε ⎤⎛∈⎜ ⎥⎝ ⎦  and )1,0(∈α . Here is 
why.  
 
Consider the function 
 
g(ε) = 1
2
+ ε . It is a linear function, 11
2
,g ⎞⎛ =⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  and 
( ) 10
2
g = . Consider next the function f (ε) = −2ε
4ε − 3 . We have that 1
1
2
,f ⎞⎛ =⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  and 
( ) 00f = . Also, 26 0(4 3'( ) )f εε >−= , and 3
48
(
''(
4 3
)
)
f εε −
−= . Since  f ''(ε) > 0  for 
10,
2
ε ⎛ ⎞∈⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ , ε( )f  is a convex function on the interval 
10,
2
ε ⎛ ⎞∈⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ . It is equal to  g(ε)  in 
 
ε = 1
2
 and is lower than  g(ε)  in  ε = 0 . From the convexity property we can be sure that 
 f (ε)  lies below  g(ε)  in the entire range 10, 2ε
⎛ ⎞∈⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ . However, to fulfil the inequalities 
α ≤ −2ε
4ε − 3  
α ≥ 1
2
+ ε  
we would have to find a point where we would be “above” g(ε)  and, at the same time, 
“below”  f (ε) ; from the properties of these functions, this is impossible. The only point 
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in the range of ε  where these two functions are equal is 1
2
ε = , but then the solution 
would be 1α =  which, considering the condition for α , is not viable. 
 
It is intuitive to see the logic underlying the two inequalities for α , and to 
understand the source of the impossibility result. For the individual with income 2 to be 
content with even a small gain in his RD and in spite of a relatively large reduction of his 
income, his α  must be small. For the individual with income 1 to be content with a 
relatively large increase of his income coming his way upon being exposed to RD, his α  
must be large. But α  cannot simultaneously be both small and large. This leads to the 
impossibility result.    
 
The impossibility result is not due to the particular numerical values {1} and {2, 3}. 
Consider any 1{ }x  and 2 3{ , }x x  such that 1 2 3x x x< < . The change in the wellbeing of the 
individual with income 2x  upon the merger, where θ  is the amount to be transferred to 
the individual with income 1x , is 
{ }1 2 3 2
2 2 2 3 2
max ( ),0 ( )) 1( (1 ) [ (1 ) ( )].
3
) ( (
)
2
x x x x
u x x x x
θ θα α α αθ θ+ − + − −⎡ ⎤Δ = − − − − − −⎥⎣
− −⎢ ⎦
 
Since 2uΔ  is a decreasing function of θ , the maximal amount that we could take away 
from the individual with income 2x  without making him worse off following a merger is 
the amount θ  that makes him retain his pre-merger level of wellbeing, that is, an amount 
such that 2 0uΔ = . 
 
We investigate two possible cases, which correspond to the original ranking being 
preserved (case 1) or not (case 2). 
 
Case 1. 1 21 2' 'x x xxθ θ≤ == + − , so 2 12
xxθ ≤ − . Then: 
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3
2 22 2
2
3
( )) 1( (1 ) [ (1 ) ( )]
3
(
2
) x xu x x x xθα αθ α α− −⎡ ⎤Δ = − − − − + − −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦  
and 2 0uΔ = for: 
3 2(1 )
2 4
( )xxαθ α
−= +
− . 
We can then transfer this amount to the individual with income 1x  so his change of 
wellbeing becomes: 
3 1 2 1
1
1
1 1
2 3
( ( ( )( (1 )
3
) ( ) ))
1 ) ) (4 1))( (4 8 (5 4
6 12
.
x x x xu x
x x x
xθ θ θθ
α α α αα
α α α− + − − +Δ = + − − −
= + ++
+
− − − −
 
The term 1
6 12
α
α
−
+  is obviously strictly positive, so we investigate the sign of the term 
1 2 3(4 8 (5 4) ) (4 1)x x xα α α+ +− − − . 
Joining the conditions on θ : 2 1
2
xxθ ≤ −  and 3 2(1 )
2 4
( )xxαθ α
−= +
−  we obtain that 
2 3
1
(2 )
1 2
)( 1 xx xα αα
+ −+≤ + . 
So we have: 
1 2 3
2 3
2
2 3 2
2 3
3
3
) ) (4 1)
(2 ) ) ) (4 1)
1 2
(8 4 ) 4) ) (4
(4 8 (5 4
( 1) (4 8 (5 4
(4 (5 4
3( ) 0.
1)
x x
x x x
x x x x
x
x
x
x
α α α
α α α α αα
α α α α
− − −
+≤ −
+ +
+ − + +
+ − +
− −+
= +
=
−
− <
− −
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We conclude that in this case 1 0uΔ < . Thus, upon a merger, the individual with income 
1x  experiences a decrease in his wellbeing even if we transfer to him the largest possible 
amount from the individual with income 2x . 
 
Case 2. 1 21 2' 'x x xxθ θ> == + − , so 2 12
xxθ > − . Then: 
1 2 3
2
3 2
2 2
2) ( ((( )) ( )) ( )( (1 ) [ (1) ) ]
3 2
x x x x x xu x xθ θθθα α α α+ − + − − −⎡ ⎤Δ = − − − − − −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
−  
and 2 0uΔ =  for: 
 1 2 3
1 ( 1)(2
6
)xa x xθ −− −= . 
When we transfer this amount to the individual with income 1x , we get that 
3 1
1 11
1 2 3
(( (1 )
3
))
(1 ( 4 ( () 1) )1 2
18
(5 2 )).
x xu x x
x x x
θθ
α α α α
α α α
−
− +Δ = + − − −
+ −= −− − +
 
But from 1 2 3x x x< <  we obtain 
1 2 3
2 2 2
(4 (1 (1 2
(4
) ) (5 2 ))
)(1 ( ) ( 2 )) .1 2 5 0
x x
x
x
x x
α α α
α α α
− + +
< − + +
− −
− − =  
So, again, we cannot make 1uΔ  higher than zero by transferring to the individual with 
income 1x  an amount which will not harm the individual with income 2x . 
 
We had implicitly assumed here that '3 1x x> ; otherwise the individual with income 
3x  would also have needed compensation, as his deprivation would have increased from 
zero to a positive value. 
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This completes the proof that for any populations 1{ }x  and 2 3{ , }x x , such that 
1 2 3x x x< < , it is impossible to enact a self-contained tax and transfer policy that will 
retain post-merger levels of wellbeing at their pre-merger magnitudes.  
 
Third, to further see why the implementation of a “tax and transfer” policy will 
meet hurdles, suppose that 100 individuals with incomes 1 each, that is {1, 1, 1, 1, …, 1} 
join {2, 3}. The gain of the individual with income 2 can, in principle, be “confiscated 
away,” with the taken income distributed amongst all the individuals with income 1. In 
order for these individuals to be better off with their extra income, they would need to 
have a very high α and a very low disregard for RD, which is very much against the spirit 
of our basic presumption that individuals care about relative deprivation considerably. 
 
In sum: in the exhibited cases, a “tax and transfer” scheme cannot achieve its aim 
because there is not enough of a gain to placate the losers while still keeping the gainers 
as well off as prior to the merger. In a way, this wellbeing “impossibility result” is akin to 
the total relative deprivation “superadditivity result:” here as there, aggregate welfare 
takes a beating. 
 
5. Conclusions  
 
As already noted in the Introduction, mergers of populations occur in all spheres of life, 
and in all times and places. Mergers arise as a result of administrative considerations or 
naturally, they are imposed or chosen by election. A merger of populations is a far cry 
from the merger of production lines. The social environment and the social horizons that 
the individuals who constitute the merged population face change fundamentally upon a 
merger: others who were previously outside the individuals’ social domain are now 
within. One consequence of this revision of the social landscape, which hitherto appears 
not to have received attention, is a “built-in” increase in social dismay. Social welfare is 
affected. Revisiting the European integration example, we contend that in and by itself, 
this integration can exacerbate social harmony and chip at societal wellbeing in quite 
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unexpected ways. A Policy aimed at effectively reversing the deleterious effect of the 
merger of populations was delineated, illustrated, and evaluated. A tentative conclusion 
suggested by this assessment is that holding all relevant considerations constant, 
countering the adverse social welfare effect of the merger of populations may well 
mandate tapping the government’s coffers.   
 
The “superadditivity result” that we derived in this paper is for a specific measure 
of a population’s total relative deprivation (equation (2)). Recalling footnote 2, the appeal 
of this measure is that it emanates from a solid social-psychological foundation, it rests 
on a sound axiomatic basis, and it was shown to be empirically significant. Still, a 
population’s total relative deprivation could be measured in a variety of ways and by 
different indices, and it remains to be checked whether our main claims are yielded by 
other measures. (For example, it is possible to think about the aggregate of the individual 
relative deprivations as a weighted rather than as a simple sum, where the weights 
increase with the extent of the individuals’ relative deprivation.) Conversely, the 
superadditivity property could be considered as an axiom of deprivation indices and if so, 
incorporating this axiom in the characterization of these indices could yield profound 
insights about deprivation, and lead to a new class of deprivation indices. 
 15 
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